I need to store 256 characters in a UCCE variable, looking for ideas.

[david.macias]

I want to build a Finesse gadget that sends data to an API, this API needs a 256 character unique ID I receive when the call first arrives to Cisco. The format is generally something like this f34bc05d-5ea5-4091-adc7-67a03e1234f9 however the documentation states that this ID could grow up to 256 characters. Which means that in reality there is no set format as I assume any one section, separated by the dashes, could grow up to 51 characters. So I have a single 256 long string or potentially 5 strings of 51 characters each that I need to store. I need to pass this string on to Finesse and I can't figure out a way to do this. I've looked at ECC Payloads, but I don't believe these will solve my problem as they have a 40 character limit. I want to avoid having to build a DB for this use case as that open another can of worms. Is there something I can do?

david

[david.macias]

Ok, so I might have forgotten how ECC variables worked, I might be able to have 5 variables each of 55 bytes (to be safe) then cut up the ID into smaller chunks. Testing this out.

[SEAN NILSEN]

ECC is probably going to be the way to go... BUT... there is still a payload limit per-call, so depending on what you are actually trying to enable on the client-side in Finesse [security concerns], it may actually be better to (assuming AWS datastores are available...) have an obfuscated key that lives in a Key-Vaue pair in Dynamo or other store [AWS constraints, architecture, and data requirements matter, obviously] that you control and pass that obfuscated/size-constrained key instead to avoid the drama caused by the SIP header values (assuming this is where the value originates?) exceeding the PV and/or ECC variable capability in ICM.

Another option, depending on your specific signaling path and components available, there may be an option to route the call through a VXML application to handle the data correlation (aka - directly access the SIP headers from VXML and bypass the ICM limitation entirely) before it even attempts to signal over to Finesse. This also contains the security boundary to the VXML server. I have questions about how the Finesse gadget authenticates whatever its about to do with that key data...